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POSITIVE ACTION AND 
EUROPEAN UNION LA W IN 
THE YEAR 2000 
1. INTRODUCTION 
PAUL HODAPP, THOMAS TRELOGAN AND 
STEVE MAZURANA' 
This paper is the third in a series in which we examine the similarities 
and differences between the European and American approaches to the 
problem of positive (or affirmative) action. In the two previous papers 
we examined whether certain positive action plans adopted by European 
legislatures would be constitutional under the Equal Protection clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.' In this paper our aim is limited to updating our 
analysis of positive action in the European Union with an analysis of 
three recent European Court of Justice ("the Court") decisions. The 
decisions are Re: Badeck,2 Abrahamsson,3 and Schnorbus v. Land Hesse.4 
We shall also consider proposed changes to the Equal Treatment 
Directive, the basic legal principle at the foundation of the Court's 
judgments in these cases. 
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1. Paul Hodapp & Steve Mazurana, Affir1lUltive Action in Public Employment: An 
International Comparison, 16 MIDWEST L. REV. 90 (1999); Paul Hodapp, Steve Mazurana and 
Thomas Trelogan, AjJir1lUltive Action in Public Employment: An International Comparison II, in 
EUROPEAN STUDIES CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: SELECTED PAPERS FROM 1993 TO 1999, 171-184 
(Odwarka and Stefancic eds., 2001). For a general discussion of the equal treatment principle in 
European Union law, see ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 
(Oxford University Press 1999). 
2. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000). 
3. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5539 (July 6, 2000). 
4. Case C-79199, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7,2000). 
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II. THE ISSUE iN THREE RECENT CASES OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF JUSTICE 
The general issue before the Court in these cases was whether certain 
provisions of the national laws at issue were consistent with the Equal 
Treatment Directive.s These provisions provided positive or affirmative 
action in public employment for women in order to gain equal access to 
employment by means of binding employment targets. 
A. BACKGROUND OF POSITIVE ACTION IN EUROPE 
The Equal Treatment Directive provides that there shall be no 
discrimination, either direct or indirect, on the basis of sex, but there is 
an exception to the prohibition for measures to promote equality of 
opportunity for men and women, particularly those measures that remove 
existing inequalities affecting women's opportunities. The Court applied 
the principles it had already enunciated in Marschall V. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen6 and Kalanke V. Freie Hansestadt Bremen.7 In deciding the 
general issue in the three cases under discussion, the Court was not 
required to establish new legal principles for the interpretation of the 
Directive. 
However, the Court relied on changes that had been made in European 
Community law since the time it reached these decisions. A new 
paragraph 4 of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (now 141 of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam)8 states that to achieve full practical equality between men 
and women in pubiic employment, member states may adopt specific 
advantages for an under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity 
or to overcome disadvantages in professional careers. Declaration 28 
concerning Article 141 annexed to the final act of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam states that member states should, in the first instance, aim at 
improving the situation of women in working life.9 
S. Council Directive 76/207, 1976 OJ. (L 39/40). 
6. Case C-409/95 , Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. 1-06363, 1997 
E.C.1. Celex Nexis 4798 (Nov. II, 1997). 
7. Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-03051 (1995). The 
basic rule established by these two cases is that an employer must have discretion to overcome the 
presumption favoring a female candidate due to information concerning special circumstances of 
equally qualified male candidates so long as these special circumstances are not themselves 
discriminatory. 
8. 4 Eur. Union L Rep. (CCH) para. 25,500 at 10526-7 (ratified May 1, 1999). 
9. [d. 
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In our view the language of the Treaty is stronger and more proactive 
regarding equality for women than the language of the Directive. The 
Directive permits member states to adopt positive action plans if they are 
intended to achieve equality of opportunity for women by removing 
obstacles to fair competition between men and women. The Treaty 
permits the use of positive action not only as a means to formal or 
competitive equality but also as a means to substantive equality for 
women as persons who work but who have additional responsibilities to 
provide for families as well. \0 
Similarly, the Advocate General ("AG") who authored the opmlon to 
assist the Court in Re: Badeck took a more radical position than the 
Court in relying, as he did, on these additions to European Community 
law. He interpreted the new provisions in the Treaty of Amsterdam as 
requiring a broad interpretation of the Equal Treatment Directive and the 
equality provisions in the treaties - one that capitalizes as much as 
possible on what they permit. 1I The AG went so far as to suggest that 
positive action is a permissible means to equal treatment of men and 
women when some gender-based disadvantage cannot be remedied in 
any other way. In effect, the AG cast doubt on the Court's interpretation 
that positive action is an exception to the equality principle in the 
Directive that must be narrowly interpreted. 
The AG also rejected the Court's starting gate analogy, an analogy that 
suggests that positive action is justified only when it enables women to 
compete with men for jobs. Instead, the AG proposed that positive 
action may be justified when women are in a particularly difficult 
situation in the job market and the principle of non-discrimination does 
not assist in improving their situation. In these situations member states 
may use positive preferences for women to increase the number of 
women in the workplace and thus to have a real effect on the social 
10. Those who seek formal equality focus on notions of equal opportunity and fonnal, 
procedural, and neutral application of non-discriminatory and gender-neutral law in public 
employment and in the marketplace. Those who seek substantive equality are more concerned with 
results and outcomes, with equal shares rather than equal treatment. Proponents of substantive 
equality favor direct intervention in workplace practices in order to achieve a proportional 
distribution of men and women in the workforce. They also favor such measures as quotas, 
preferential hiring of women and unconditional rights for the disadvantaged gender or group in the 
workplace. See Catherine Barnard, Gender Equality in the EU: A Balance Sheet, in THE EU AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 215-279 (Alston ed., 1999). 
II. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Opinion at para. 26-27. 
For a general discussion of the Advocate General in the European Court of Justice, see ARNULL, 
supra note I, 7-9. In summary, the AG, a member of the Court, submits a written opinion to the 
deciding judges of the Court. The AG's opinion outlines how the case fits within existing EC law 
and recommends a resolution of the case which the Court may use as the basis for its judgment. 
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integration of women, provided the content of the positive action plan is 
not arbitrary, that it does not excessively impinge on the rights of men, 
and that it is not disproportionate to the real needs of women. In other 
words, the AG adopted a substantive, results-oriented approach to 
positive action to replace the formal, rights-oriented approach the Court 
had previously used. 
The distinction between formal and substantive equality must be grasped 
to understand the position of the Court in the cases that will be discussed 
below. The Court, unlike this AG, has accepted formal or competitive 
positive action as the only permissible means to achieve gender equality, 
understood in terms of the goal of removing obstacles to equal 
opportunity for women. The Court appears to believe that its position is 
a compromise between permitting no gender discrimination whatsoever 
and promoting substantive equality for women. The Court may also 
reject the communalistic defense sometimes given for substantive gender 
equality, namely, that substantive gender equality is a social good that 
outweighs the right of each individual to have his or her merit evaluated 
individually.12 
It is also important to understand the limited jurisdiction of the Court to 
hear these cases. The procedural posture of these three cases was that the 
Court had jurisdiction to hear the cases pursuant to Article 177 (now 234 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam) which permits the Court to hear cases 
submitted by national courts within the European Dnion.13 In each case 
the national court asked the Court to interpret the relevant, European 
Union law so that the national court might use that interpretation of ED 
law in interpreting its national law consistently with ED law. The Court 
did not render a judgment for one party under the national law; it 
clarified EU law for the national court that rendered a judgment for the 
parties. Thus, the function of the Court under Article 177 is to ensure the 
uniform interpretation of EU law, not by making direct rulings on the 
compatibility of national law with ED law but by interpreting EU law in 
the context of a specific national law. 
12. Services Industrial Professional & Technical Union [hereinafter SIPTU) at www.siptu.ie. 
See also Gwyneth Pitt, Can Reverse Discrimination Be Justified? in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMIT OF 
LAW 281-99 (Hepple and Szyszcak eds., 1992). 
13. Eur. Union L Rep., supra note 8. For a general discussion of preliminary rulings by the 
Court, see RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (St. Martin's Press 1998) and 
ARNULL, supra note I, at 49-69. 
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B. RE:BADECK 
1. Issue 
The specific issue before the Court was whether certain provisions 
adopted by the Government of Hesse, Germany, containing binding 
targets for increasing the proportion of women in sectors of public 
employment in which they were under-represented could be so 
interpreted as to be consistent with the Equal Treatment Directive. 
2. Procedural History 
Forty-six members of the Hesse legislature (the applicants) initiated legal 
proceedings to review the legality of certain positive action provisions in 
the law of Hesse. The national court sought a preliminary ruling from 
the European Court of Justice interpreting the EU's equality law with 
respect to the national law. The applicants argued that the national law 
violated the principle of merit and the fundamental right of each 
employee to equality of opportunity because it ensured a final result or 
quota and thereby gave women an unfair advantage in employment. 
3. First Challenged Provision 
The Land Hesse required that its administrative departments eliminate 
under-representation of women by means of advancement plans for 
women. I' Each plan had to provide that more than one-half of job 
openings must be offered to women who were equally qualified with the 
male candidates, unless there existed reasons of greater legal weight that 
opposed the preference for a female candidate. The plans for each career 
group were valid for two years or until the number of women employees 
equaled or exceeded the number of male employees in the group. 
AG Saggio decided that this provision of the law could be interpreted as 
consistent with the EU law.15 The national law did not prevent male 
applicants from competing with female applicants by establishing a 
quota of female hires without regard to the suitability of all candidates 
for a specific position. 
The Court agreed that there was no inconsistency between the national 
law and the equality provisions of EU law so long as the national law 
14. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Judgment at para. 7-9. 
15. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Opinion at para. 7,8 & 
33-38. 
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allowed each applicant to be objectively assessed for each position in a 
way that involved considering all relevant information for each candidate 
for each position.16 The national law allowed preferences to promote the 
disabled, part-time employees, certain former public service and military 
employees, and men who had been unemployed for a long time. 17 Thus, 
in evaluating each candidate, an employer had to consider all these 
preferences, in addition to the preference for women. Furthermore, an 
employer, in deciding whether a preference had been rebutted, had to 
consider all relevant individual characteristics of each employee, e.g., 
length of service, work history, and job mobility. 
In conclusion, in Re: Badeck the Court continued to insist that any 
preference for women in employment constitute not an absolute 
presumption but at most a rebuttable presumption that could be rebutted 
in favor of a male candidate by any relevant objective consideration that 
was not itself discriminatory against women. 
4. Second Challenged Provision 
The second specific provision before the Court created binding targets 
for women's employment in certain academic positions, i.e., temporary 
positions and assistantships. Specifically, the law provided that these 
posts had to be filled with the same proportion of women as women 
graduates, or those who had received the appropriate training in the 
relevant discipline. 18 
The AG reached the same result based on the same reasoning he used for 
the first issue. 19 The Court agreed.20 The Court noted that any hiring 
decision had to be subject to overriding objective criteria such as those 
described in the discussion of the first issue. The Court concluded that 
the law did not establish a binding target or quota requiring that a certain 
number of women be appointed for each position. Instead, the number of 
women appointed was fixed by the number of persons trained for the 
position. In other words, the quota was not absolute or inflexible but was 
relative to a reasonable standard, the number of women trained for the 
position. In addition, women were to be encouraged to apply for these 
positions, but if no qualified women applied, then a male candidate could 
be hired. 
16. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Judgment at 35-38. 
17. [d. 
18. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Judgment at para. 39. 
19. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Opinion at para. 39. 
20. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Judgment at para. 40-44. 
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5. Third Challenged Provision 
The third provision before the Court was a provision of the law that fixed 
a minimum quota for women receiving job training based on the 
proportion of women already employed in specific job sectors, but that 
required that at least one-half of all training places be allocated to 
women. 
The AG allowed that on its face this provision sought a specific result, 
namely, a fixed percentage of women in training positions/' but he 
maintained that the law could be interpreted as consistent with EO law 
because the result sought was not an employment result but a training 
result. Consequently, he argued, the provision could be justified as a 
way to increase employment opportunities for women by removing an 
important cause of their lack of employment, namely, lack of training. 
The Court agreed, and carefully distinguished this training case from 
cases involving employment decisions.22 The Court emphasized that 
since the state had no monopoly on training opportunities (since training 
programs were also available in the private sector) this provision of the 
law did not totally exclude men from training opportunities since the law 
governed only public employment in Land Hesse. Even so, the Court 
recognized that the chance that a man would be accepted into a training 
program was reduced because of the law, yet it held that this reduction 
was justified because women's opportunities to compete with men for 
later employment could not be increased without increasing the number 
of training positions for women, and because the training quota did not 
completely exclude men from such positions. 
Thus, the Court rejected the argument that a quota automatically violates 
men's rights to equal opportunities, and in so doing, moved away from 
the strict dichotomy between permissible equal opportunities and 
impermissible equal results that the applicants claimed was the holding 
of Kalanke v. Bremen.23 Instead, the Court stressed that the Equal 
Treatment Directive prohibits inflexible quotas. Since training positions 
were available in the private sector, it reasoned, no man was completely 
excluded from training by the government quota. 
It would thus appear that according to the Court an inflexible quota is 
one that completely excludes men from a position. It remains to be seen 
21. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Opinion at para 40. 
22. Case C-158/97, re Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Judgment at para. 51-55. 
23. Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-03051 (1995). 
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if this reading of the Directive will be limited to pure training positions 
held prior to employment or will be extended to employment/training 
positions. Pure training is necessary for employment, but training for a 
higher position may require employment in a lower position that in effect 
operates as on-the-job training. 
If the Court's ruling is not limited to pure tralfung posItions, then 
arguably a quota for an employment/training position is not inflexible 
and thus is permissible so long as there is evidence that male candidates 
for the position can obtain similar positions in the private sector. Since 
this will often be the case, virtually no quota for an employment/training 
position can be considered inflexible and hence impermissible on this 
basis alone. 
The authors are not challenging the Court's result, of which we approve. 
But we do wish to emphasize that the Court is allowing member states to 
use positive action in a way that virtually compels an employment 
decision favoring women. This is an important policy preference for the 
Court not for this reason alone, but also because of the opposition in 
some of the member states to any form of quota, which, it is argued, is a 
form of impermissible reverse discrimination.24 
6. Fourth Challenged Provision 
The fourth specific issue before the Court concerned a provision of the 
law that guaranteed job interviews for qualified women for positions for 
which women were under-represented. 
The AG and tbe Court agreed that this provision was consistent with the 
EU Directive.25 The provision did not require an inflexible result in 
hiring a certain number of women, but merely aided women in the 
deliberative process for a position. Thus, as with the training issue, the 
Court construed the Equal Treatment Directive broadly so as to allow 
positive action to aid women in the process up to the final employment 
decision. This result is consistent with the prior position of the Court 
that positive action is permissible so long as it helps women achieve 
equality of opportunity with men. Positive action is inconsistent with 
equal opportunity when it seeks to achieve a specific result, that is, a 
24. EU PROPOSALS TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION, English House of Lords, Select Committee 
on the E.U. 9th Report, 25 May 2000 at para.122-24 at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co. uk/pa/ld 199900lldselectlldeucom/6816809 .htm. 
25. Case C-158/97, re Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Opinion at para 41; 
Judgment at para. 60-63. 
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specific number of women in a specific job, by means of an inflexible 
quota. 
One may wonder if the Court would have reached the same result had 
there been evidence before it that qualified men might not be granted 
interviews because an employer determined that for cost reasons, say, it 
could interview only a certain number of persons, all of whom were 
qualified women. Suppose, for example, that an employer decides that it 
can afford to interview only three candidates for any job openings. 
Three women are qualified and thus are interviewed. One male 
candidate has qualifications that appear superior to the qualifications of 
any of the female candidates prior to the interviews. But as a result of 
the interviews at least one female candidate is judged superior to the 
male candidate. Each candidate has been objectively considered in light 
of all available evidence, but the male candidate has not been afforded 
the opportunity to provide the sort of evidence that can emerge from a 
job interview. Such a procedure might greatly aid the job prospects of 
women and so allow employers to structure the evaluation process to 
favor women. Opponents of positive action might argue that such a 
procedure hardly appears consistent with equal opportunity for men and 
women. The interview quota creates an obstacle to the hiring of men that 
does not exist for women. And yet such a procedure might not appear 
impermissible to the Court, because the inequality would exist with 
respect to a pre-employment decision and the Court is prepared to allow 
greater member-state flexibility for positive action in such decisions than 
it would for positive action in employers' final employment decisions. 
However, at least one commentator believes that any all-woman short list 
violates the Equal Treatment Directive.26 
Again, we are not challenging the Court's decision, of which we 
approve; rather we seek to make it clear that the Court is allowing 
member states' legislative bodies to virtually compel employment 
decisions favoring women without expressly stating so. 
7. Fifth Challenged Provision 
The fifth specific provision before the Court did not involve employment 
directly. Instead, it involved appointments to employee representative 
bodies and to supervisory bodies, i.e., internal administrative bodies of 
26. Peter Jebsen, The Need for More Women Members of Parliament, NEW L.J. (April 7, 
2000) at www.peterjepson.comlnew_page_18.htm. 
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the employer. The law at issue required that one-half of all the members 
of these bodies be'women. 
The AG decided that there was no way to interpret this provision to make 
it consistent with the Equal Treatment Directive,27 as on its face the 
position created a fixed number of positions for women regardless of 
their qualifications and the rights of men to compete for these positions. 
The Court disagreed.28 The Court interpreted this provision as non-
mandatory, thus reading it in light of the provision discussed earlier to 
the effect that certain objective criteria may rebut the presumption in 
favor of the woman. According to the Court, the provision did not 
establish a mandatory or inflexible quota. Instead, the law recommended 
a goal to the employer which allowed the employer to consider criteria 
other than gender in making appointments to these bodies, so long as 
gender was one factor in the decision until women constituted fifty 
percent of the members of these bodies. Only under this second 
interpretation could the national law be consistent with EU law. 
8. Significance of This Decision 
First, the AG proposed that in light of recent provisions regarding gender 
equality in the Treaty of Amsterdam, national laws promoting positive 
action for women are to be broadly interpreted so as to increase the 
integration of women into the workplace. In deciding this case, the 
Court did not need to revisit its interpretation of the Equal Treatment 
Directive that positive action is only justified to enable women to 
compete with men. Perhaps in a future case the Court will follow this 
AG and interpret positive action not as a narrow exception to the equality 
principle but as an indispensable means to the end of fully integrating 
women into the workplace whenever other means have failed to achieve 
this goal. 
Second, the Court has insisted that any preference for women must be 
rebuttable by objective criteria that do not themselves discriminate 
against women. In this case, the Court allowed a national legislature to 
create other gender-neutral preferences that public employers may use to 
override the gender preference. In addition, the European Commission 
has submitted a proposal to implement the principle of equal treatment 
for all persons by prohibiting discrimination based on race and ethnic 
27. Case C-158/97. re Badeck. 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28. 2000). Opinion at para. 42. 
28. Case C-158/97. re Badeck. 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar, 28. 2000). Judgment at para, 64-66. 
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origin.29 Future empirical investigations should reveal whether public 
employers are using preferences for other groups to dilute the effect the 
gender preference might have in placing more women in substantial 
positions in the workplace. 
Third, the limitations, if any, on an employer's consideration of the 
objective criteria justifying hiring a man contrary to a preference for 
women have not been settled by the Court. For example, work history 
and length of service are objective criteria that are relevant to an 
employment decision, and so they are available in a specific employment 
decision to enable a public employer to hire a man over an equally 
qualified women for a position where women are under-represented. 
However, if women in fact are out of the workplace for longer periods 
than men, in part because of the need to care for children, then is this 
criterion impermissible because it has a discriminatory impact on female 
employment? 
Fourth, if evidence becomes available that positive action is not working 
to increase the number of women in significant positions in the 
workplace/o in part because of the reasons described above, is the Court 
prepared to say that positive action has increased opportunities for 
women to compete for jobs? If the answer is "yes," then must the Court 
conclude that women have failed to compete successfully because of 
individual or social forces that the EU law is not prepared to remedy? Or 
will the Court adopt the position of AG Saggio that EU law should be 
broadly interpreted so as to permit positive action to go farther than it 
presently has? 
Fifth, the Court has affirmed its intent to continue to distinguish between 
impermissible fixed quotas and permissible flexible goals. However, in 
the case of employment quotas tied to vocational training and interview 
quotas, the Court is prepared to search out ways to allow quotas that 
initially appear inflexible. For example, the Court allows academic 
quotas when they are tied to the number of persons trained, a number that 
may vary from time to time so that men are not completely excluded 
from these positions. However, opponents of positive action may argue 
that a quota is still inflexible if the employer selects a method that 
virtually or in practice guarantees that a woman will be hired, even 
without setting an absolute number of women to be hired. In these 
29. Council Directive 2000/431EC of June 29, 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal 
Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 0.1. (L 16E156). 
30. ARNULL, supra note I, at 505. 
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circumstances, is the Court balancing the desirability of men's not losing 
significant employment opportunities to women if similar training 
opportunities are available in the private sector against the gain in 
employment opportunities for women? What if the facts that must be 
considered to achieve such a balance are different in different cases? 
What if the cost of private training is prohibitively expensive? 
In summary, the Court must be forward-looking in its principles. What if 
the free market economy does not insure that employers do not 
discriminate in the final analysis? If the Court's narrow interpretation of 
the Equal Treatment Directive in terms of a sharp dichotomy between 
equal opportunities and equal results is intended to al~ow the market to 
solve this problem and it does not, then what will the Court do? It is 
possible that the Court will appeal to judicial conservatism, maintaining 
that it is merely an interpreter of laws passed by others. It seems to us 
that the Court should recognize that a key principle of interpretation is to 
appreciate the goal sought by the lawmaker and to assist the lawmaker in 
achieving that goal. We question whether the flexible/inflexible 
dichotomy will achieve the goal of improving the situation of working 
women under the narrow interpretation of the Court, unless the Court's 
reasoning is expanded as has been suggested above. The Court should 
recognize that an employment quota, and not merely training or 
interview quotas, even if it is inflexible in the short term, is a permissible 
means to achieve equality of opportunity, especially if the more limited 
forms of positive action permitted by the Court continue to be ineffective 
in integrating women into vocational and professional positions. Finally, 
as argued below, the Court should recognize that changes in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam point to a more expansive notion of equality than formal 
equality of opportunity. They encourage a notion of substantive equality 
that requires the workplace to be structured to accommodate different 
social and f:J~nilial responsibilities of men and women. 
C. ABRAHAMSSON 
1. Issue 
The issue of first impression in this case was whether the Equal 
Treatment Directive permitted the use of positive action where a female 
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candidate is qualified but lacks qualifications equal to those of a male 
candidate.3 ! 
2. Procedural History 
The University of Goteburg in Sweden decided to appoint a woman to a 
professorial chair. A Swedish regulation required positive action to be 
used in making such decisions since added effort was necessary to 
significantly increase the number of female professors. Swedish law 
provided that positive action could not be used when the difference in 
candidate qualifications was so great that ignoring that difference would 
breach the requirement of objective decision-making. This objectivity 
requirement had been interpreted to mean that a difference is too great if 
and only if the appointment of the less qualified candidate is likely to 
reduce the level of performance in the position.32 
The University had also instituted a plan to achieve a fairer allocation of 
teaching positions between men and women. In light of these 
considerations, the Rector of the University decided that the difference 
between the merits of a female candidate and those of a male candidate 
who was judged better qualified was not so great as to override the 
preference for a female candidate. He appointed the female candidate to 
the position.33 
The male candidate and another female candidate appealed. The male 
candidate claimed the appointment of the first female candidate was 
contrary to Swedish law and the Equal Treatment Directive.34 The 
second female candidate appealed on the ground that her qualifications 
were in fact higher than those of the female candidate who was 
appointed, and who had been ranked ahead of her in scientific 
qualifications by the selection board. She did not dispute that the male 
candidate had scientific qualifications superior to hers. 
The Court interpreted Swedish law as requiring that the preference 
favoring women be absolute. The Court found nothing in Swedish law 
31. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-05539 (July 6, 2000), Judgment 
at para. 45. 
32. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-05539 (July 6, 2000), Judgment 
at para. 23-26. 
33. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v .. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-05539 (July 6,2000), Judgment 
at para. 16-20. 
34. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-05539 (July 6, 2000), Judgment 
at para. 21. 
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to allow a genuine assessment of the objective qualifications of all 
candidates for a position. Under this interpretation, Swedish law was 
contrary to EU law. The Court then considered whether Swedish law 
could be upheld because the law was a proportionate or permissible 
means to achieve equality of opportunity. The Court concluded that it 
was not and thus found that the Swedish positive action law was contrary 
to the Equal Treatment Directive.35 
The Court also considered numerous secondary issues, which did not 
affect its result or its analysis. For example, the Court ruled its result 
would not be changed if the academic posts to which positive action was 
applied were limited to lower level positions.36 
3. Significance of This Decision 
A key question regarding the Court's reasoning is why the Court did not 
expansively interpret the Swedish law by reading into the law its 
requirement that any preference favoring women must be rebuttable by 
evidence of objective considerations that may exist for each candidate. 
One answer is that the Swedish court's interpretation of the objectivity 
principle in Swedish law precluded the Court from interpreting the 
principle differently from the way national courts had interpreted it. 
Presumably by interpreting the objectivity principle in terms of the likely 
effect of the appointment on the level of performance in the position, the 
Swedish court intended the interpretation of the principle to focus on 
consequences and not the evaluation of candidate qualifications. The 
Court may have been signaling lawmakers in other member states to 
eschew the Swedish interpretation of similar principles in favor of the 
Court's interpretation of that language. The Court may have felt that the 
Swedish interpretation was too permissive, since appointments will 
rarely be so adversely affected by differences in qualifications. Also, the 
Swedish interpretation's forward-looking stance does not allow for the 
gender preference to be rebutted by other legally permissible preferences 
for other under-represented groups. 
35. /d. 
36. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-05539 (July 6, 2000), Judgment 
at para. 57, 66. 
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D. SCHNORBUS V. LAND HESSE 
1. Issue 
The primary issue before the Court was whether an automatic priority in 
admission to legal training for persons who complete compulsory 
national service that is only available to men violated the Equal 
Treatment Directive.37 
2. Procedural History 
Ms. Schnorbus applied for practical legal trammg but was rejected 
because there were already too many applications from persons who had 
completed compUlsory national service. Her appeal was rejected on the 
ground that the preference for applicants to legal training who had 
completed compulsory service was objectively justified.38 
She appealed this decision to a higher court. In the meantime, her 
application for training was granted. Nevertheless, she maintained her 
appeal for declaratory relief that the decisions denying her training were 
a form of unlawful gender discrimination. 39 
3. Analysis 
The Court first considered whether the compulsory service preference 
constituted direct or indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination 
explicitly or necessarily treats persons differently because of their sex. 
Indirect discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral factor 
(provision, criterion or practice) disadvantages a disproportionately large 
number of persons of one sex but not the other.40 
The Court decided that the compulsory service preference was not 
directly discriminatory, but was indirectly discriminatory, because 
women, not being subject to the requirement of such service, cannot 
37. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at 
para. 16, Opinion at para. 1. 
38. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at 
para. 14-16. 
39. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.c.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at 
para. 17-19, Opinion at para. 12-17. 
40. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.c.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at 
para. 30-39, Opinion at para. 30-46, referring to Case 96/80, Jenkins 1981 E.C.R. 911, 937. See 
generalIy, Regina V. Secretary of State for Employment, Case C-167/97, Ex parte Seymour-Smith, 
1999 E.C.R. 1-0623, C.E.C. 79 (1999); and ARNULL, supra note 1,486-94. 
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benefit from the preference. In reaching this decision the Court did not 
consider statistics regarding the actual effect of the preference on women 
because the number of women who could take advantage of the 
preference was zero:' 
The Court then considered whether the preference could be saved from a 
judgment of invalidity because any discrimination is justified by 
objective considerations which are not themselves discriminatory. The 
Court concluded that the preference provided a justified way of counter-
balancing the delay in training suffered by men required to undergo 
compulsory service. Therefore, it held, the compulsory serVIce 
preference did not violate the Equal Treatment Directive.42 
4. Significance of This Decision 
The Court's reasoning can be clarified by consideration of the opinion of 
the Advocate General ("AG").4J According to the AG, two different but 
related justifications exist for discrimination in EU law. One, expressly 
relating to indirect discrimination, is set forth in Directive 97/80, which 
provides that indirect discrimination may be justified by objective factors 
unrelated to sex. The Court relied on this justification in its judgment. A 
second justification for discrimination is provided for in the Equal 
Treatment Directive and is not limited to indirect discrimination. This 
Directive provides that discrimination is justified by measures that are 
intended to promote equality of opportunity for men and women. The 
significance of the Court's judgment is that it held that the first or 
objective factors justification, though originally created for indirect 
discrimination cases, is available for direct discrimination cases as well. 
This means that a national legislature or an employer may create 
preferences for groups other than women and then may justify rebutting 
the preference in favor of women by these other objective preferences. 
EU equality law and the Court's gender discrimination decisions may 
create unrealized expectations in women, because preferences for women 
may be rebutted by preferences for other groups created by employers or 
national legislatures. The problem of balancing different preferences for 
under-represented groups is a difficult one. However, is it realistic to 
41. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at 
para. 30-39. 
42. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 20(0), Judgment at 
para. 40-47. 
43. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Opinion at 
para. 34-35,47-55. 
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expect that the limited positive action endorsed by the Court will actually 
improve the situation of women in the workplace if the limited 
preference of women can be rebutted by preferences for other under-
represented groups? Women will not believe that the failure to achieve 
equal results in the workplace lies with them, or that they have been 
allowed equality of opportunity but have simply been unable to compete 
with men. 
III. AMENDMENT TO THE EQUAL TREATMENT DIRECTIVE 
On June 7, 2000, the European Commission published its proposal to 
amend the Equal Treatment Directive. The primary purpose of the 
amendments was to establish new provisions regarding sexual 
harassment. But some amendments were made to bring the Directive in 
line with the Court's positive action case law and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and the Commission's 1999 anti-discrimination directives.44 
The Commission summarized the positive action principles derivable 
from the Court's case law as follows. Positive action is an exception to 
the principle of equal treatment that is limited to measures intended to 
eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality. No automatic priority 
for women, even if they are under-represented in a job, can be justified, 
but a rebuttable presumption in their favor can be justified if equally 
qualified male candidates for a position will be objectively assessed for 
the position. In addition, the Commission added a new Article 8 to the 
Directive, requiring member states to establish an independent body to 
promote equal treatment of men and women, which will investigate sex 
discrimination complaints, initiate administrative and judicial 
proceedings, and publish surveys and reports. 
The proposal is fine as a summary of the Court's judgments up to 
Badeck; however, the proposal does not go far enough in light of the 
criticisms of the Court's position and in light of the more proactive 
language of the Treaty. One scholar has criticized the Court's emphasis 
on free market individualism as an assumption for interpreting the Equal 
Treatment Directive. Sandra Fredman advocates that the Court consider 
that group membership is a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for 
member states to enact positive action plans that favor women.45 Others 
44. See European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line, Commission Proposes 
Amendments to 1976 Equal Treatment Directive at www.eiro.eurofound.iel2000106/features/ 
EUOOO6255F.html. 
45. Sandra Fredman, Reversing Discrimination, 113 L.Q. REV. 575, 596 (1997). 
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have also argued that women's unequal place in society, including the 
workforce, is the result of socio-historical forces, and that this inequality 
cannot be reduced by market forces alone without government 
intervention.46 
Part of the solution may be provided by the proposal for gender 
main streaming, a proposal rooted in recognition that market and 
government policies have a different impact on men and women because 
of their different family roles and due to the traditional structure of the 
workplace as a place that husbands go while their wives stay home. 
According to proponents of gender mainstreaming, positive action must 
require not just numerical equality of women with men in traditional 
husband-structured workplaces but reorganization of the workplace to 
make it easier for women to work on the job and in the home:7 The 
European Commission has adopted gender mainstreaming and has 
required that it be incorporated in all Commission policies and 
activities:8 The Commission has also recognized that the Treaty of 
Amsterdam has formalized the European commitment to gender 
mainstreaming ~y specifying that. the principle of equal treatment shall 
not prevent any member state from taking steps to promote equality 
between men and women.49 
As these advances in the Commission's thinking about gender equality 
are incorporated by the Court, undoubtedly the Court's positive action 
judgments will move beyond formal equality of opportunity for women 
to compete with men in a man's world. The Court will likely recognize 
that genuine gender equality requires that positive action plans be 
constructed to recognize differences in the biology, culture, and social 
responsibilities of men and women. A successful positive action plan 
46. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Affirmative Action: A Discussion Paper, 
Consistency 2000 Report, Part C at www.justice.govt.nzlpubs/reportsI1998lhrc_consistency/ 
part_c_12.htmL 
47. Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation of Good 
Practices, Final Report of Activities of the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming, Council of 
Europe Comm. of Ministers, Doc. No. GR-EG(98)1 (1998) at http://www.coe.fr/cmlreports/1998/ 
98gregl.htm. See also Pollack & Hafner-Burton, Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union, 7 
J. EUR. PUB. POL'y 432 (2000). 
48. Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into all Community Policies and 
Activities, 1996 O.J. (C 386), COM(96)67. See also Mainstreaming Equal Opportunities for 
Women and Men in Structural Fund Programmes and Projects, COM(98)122. But see, SIPTU, 
supra note 12 where it is stated that despite the verbal commitment the Commission has made little 
progress in integrating research into the differential effects of its policies on men and women, which 
is a first step in effecti ve gender mainstreaming. 
49. Towards A Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001-2005), 
COM(00)335, Brussels, July 6, 2000. 
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consistent with EU law not only reduces inequalities so that women can 
join men in the traditional workplace, but also creates workplaces III 
which differences between men and women are respected. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although affirmative action cases in the United States involving gender 
discrimination have recently received less attention than cases involving 
racial discrimination, particularly cases involving public contracts and 
higher education, the authors believe it is important for the United States 
to remain focused on the need for affirmative action for women. Recent 
decisions of the European Court of Justice involving positive action for 
women in employment and the amendments to the underlying EU gender 
equality law should help Americans keep the issue alive. Further, 
familiarity with European opinions, judgments, directives, and treaties 
can not only can help Americans rethink arguments for and against 
various affirmative action proposals in light of the reasoning employed in 
European discussions,50 it can also make them aware of new methods of 
affirmative action being tried in Europe that might be attempted in the 
States. 
50. European plans upheld by the European Court of 1ustice in Marschall, Badek, 
Abrahamsson, and Schnorbus would allow an affirmative action plan that seeks to achieve the same 
proportion of women in each job as exists in the general popUlation. Such plans have been rejected 
by the U. S. Supreme Court on numerous occasions on grounds that they are based on an 
unsupported assumption that women will make up the same percentage of applicants for any given 
position as they do in the general popUlation. 
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